The introduction of a “lifetime” entry ban into Belgian foreigners’ law: critical analysis of a controversial project
On February 26, 2026, the Belgian government submitted to the Chamber a bill amending the law of December 15, 1980 relating to access to the territory, stay, establishment and removal of foreigners (DOC 56 1377/001). (Parliamentarian stuk/Parliamentary document)
This initiative aims to introduce the possibility of pronouncingindefinite entry bans, commonly referred to as “lifetime bans”, against certain categories of foreigners residing illegally.
More precisely, the measure targets people registered in the T.E.R. database. (Terrorism, Extremism, Radicalization process), including in particular individuals considered terrorists, potentially violent extremists or preachers of hatred.
In its opinion no. 78.486/4 of December 15, 2025, the Council of State formulated several substantial reservations regarding the conformity and consistency of the proposed system. It must be noted, however, that these observations have not been fully integrated into the submitted version of the project. (78486.pdf)
1. The general economy of the envisaged system
The bill is structured around three main modifications to the law of December 15, 1980.
Firstly, it introduces, in article 1, § 1, 8°, a new legal category: theentry ban for life, distinct from existing fixed-term bans.
Secondly, it adapts the applicable regimes according to the status of the person concerned. Thus, for citizens of the European Union and members of their family (article 44nonies, § 2), a lifetime ban can be pronounced when the person concerned is qualified as a “validated entity” registered in the T.E.R. database, the scope of this measure being however limited to Belgian territory.
On the other hand, for third-country nationals (article 74/11, § 1), such a ban may accompany a expulsion decision and produce its effects throughout the Schengen area.
Thirdly, the project regulates the modalities for lifting the measure. A request based on professional or academic reasons can only be submitted after the expiry of a period of twenty years, while a waiver for humanitarian reasons remains possible without any time limit, but exclusively at the initiative of the person concerned.
2. The legal uncertainties raised by the Council of State
In its aforementioned opinion, the Council of State identifies several major weaknesses.
The most decisive question concerns the compatibility of the project with Directive 2008/115/EC relating to the return of illegally staying third-country nationals. Article 3(6) of that directive defines the entry ban as a measure limited in time. The introduction of an entry ban of indefinite duration therefore appears, prima facie, difficult to reconcile with this definition.
The Council of State notes in this regard that the Court of Justice of the European Union is currently seized of a preliminary question (case C-446/24) relating to a similar mechanism, which gives this problem an imminent contentious dimension.
Furthermore, the Council draws attention to the question of the proportionality of the measure with regard to minors. Since the notion of “validated entity” is likely to target people aged twelve and over, it is up to the legislator to demonstrate that the imposition of a lifetime entry ban is compatible with the proportionality requirements applicable to this particularly vulnerable category. However, the government’s response remains incomplete on this point.
Finally, the Council highlights a difficulty linked to the articulation between the deregistration of the T.E.R. base. and maintaining the entry ban. The fact that the measure can persist independently of its initial administrative basis raises questions with regard to the principles of legality and proportionality.
3. A project in tension with developments in European Union law
The Belgian initiative is part of a broader reform of European law of return. On March 11, 2025, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation aimed at establishing a common return system (COM(2025) 101 final), intended to replace Directive 2008/115/EC.
On March 9, 2026, the LIBE committee of the European Parliament adopted a series of amendments to this proposal.
It appears from this work that entry bans would, in principle, be limited to a maximum duration of ten years, with the possibility of extension by successive periods of five years. A permanent ban would only be considered in specific cases, notably in the event of a serious threat to security.
In this context, the introduction of a national, potentially automatic, lifetime entry ban mechanism appears to be out of step with the European guidelines currently being developed. The government is also aware of this, while considering that it is not appropriate to postpone the adoption of the project while awaiting the outcome of the European process.
4. The structural weaknesses of the system with regard to jurisprudential requirements
The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union requires rigorous individualization of entry ban measures.
In the judgmentFilev and Osmani(C-297/12), the Court specified that the duration of a ban must be determined taking into account all the circumstances specific to each case. This requirement is reinforced by the rulingK.A.(C-82/16), which requires family life and the best interests of the child to be taken into consideration.
However, the mechanism envisaged by the project, in particular the possibility of requesting the lifting of the measure after a period of twenty years, does not guarantee an automatic periodic review in accordance with these requirements.
In the field of the European Court of Human Rights, the analysis proposed in the explanatory memorandum also appears insufficient. This is limited to a reference to the judgmentMutlag v. Germany(2010), without incorporating more recent jurisprudential developments relating to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
However, several recent decisions — notablyKaya v. Germany,Sharafane v. Denmark,Al-Habeeb v. DenmarkAndMiari v. Denmark— highlight the requirement for strict control of proportionality of entry bans, with regard to the right to respect for private and family life.
Finally, Regulation (EU) 2018/1861 relating to the Schengen Information System provides, in Article 39, § 2, for a review of alerts after a period of five years. If this mechanism is presented by the government as a sufficient guarantee, it should be emphasized that it only concerns the maintenance of the alert in the SIS and not the entry ban decision itself. The assimilation of these two mechanisms is therefore not self-evident.
Conclusion
The bill introducing a lifetime entry ban marks a significant development in Belgian law on foreigners. However, the numerous legal uncertainties that it raises – both with regard to European Union law and constitutional requirements – raise questions about its viability in the medium term.
Between the desire for firm security and supranational legal constraints, the system appears exposed to a high risk of litigation, likely to limit, or even compromise, its effectiveness.
However, in a judgment renderedApril 23, 2026, the European Court of Justice ruled in the case446/24 in these terms: “For these reasons, the Court (fifth chamber) hereby rules:Article 3(6) and Article 11(2) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008, relating to the common standards and procedures applicable in the Member States to the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, must be interpreted as meaning that: they do not preclude national regulations under which the adoption of a ban on entry into the territory of the Member Statesunlimited durationwith regard to a national of a third country residing illegally who is the subject of a return decision is required, in principle, when this latter decisionis based on the existence of a terrorist threat, provided that the competent national authority can take due account of all the circumstances specific to each concrete casein order to justify the finding of the existence of such a threat as well as the applicability of this regulation in the concrete case concerned. » (D.T.)
The Court therefore answered the preliminary question put to it…
Nathalie Oveneke